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Abstract 
In agriculture, the coexistence of different forms of land tenancy or labour contract has been 
explained so far by several theories related to Marshallian inefficiency, incentives, risk 
sharing, and transaction costs, including supervision costs. These theories and the empirical 
evidences have greatly contributed to explain the reasons behind land tenancy or labour 
contract choice. This study follows up on this. Moreover, it intends to take a further step by 
focusing particularly on the production technologies at plot level, and by designing and testing 
a theoretical model based on household profit optimization. This model will take into account 
the supervision costs of labour (i) to compare optimum profit derived from plots based on 
household labour, a sharecropping labour contract, and a wage labour contract, controlling for 
irrigation equipment (ii) to test the efficiency of the labour contract choice using data from 
Senegal’s horticultural zone.  
As expected, the production elasticity of labour decreases when improved irrigation 
equipment like a motor pump is used. The technology displays an increasing return to scale on 
plots without a motor pump and a constant return to scale on plots irrigated with a motor 
pump. While on plots without a motor pump the sharecropping contract is the efficient labour 
contract choice, leading to a higher optimum profit for the household, on plots irrigated with a 
motor pump, the wage contract is the best labour contract choice. Consequently, we can 
conclude from this finding that the use of a motor pump drives out the sharecropping contract 
in favour of household labour and the wage labour contract.  
 
Key words: land tenancy, labour, sharecropping, wage, contract, supervision, household, 
profit optimization, efficient, irrigation equipment, horticulture, Senegal 
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1.1.   Introduction 
In Senegal, like in most African countries, horticultural households’ production systems are 
highly labour-intensive with a low capital input. The area of land that a household can crop 
out of the owned land is mainly conditional on the availability of labour. While some 
households can rely only on their household labour, others take recourse to hired labour. This 
hired labour can be based on a sharecropping contract or on a wage contract. 
Sharecropping is a form of tenancy based on an agreement between the landowner and the 
tenant in terms of input contribution and output sharing. Sharecropping has a long, worldwide 
history, but the types of agreement between landowner and tenant vary from one location to 
another. In Senegal, for instance, sharecropping is chiefly used on horticultural crops that are 
cash crops. The agreement is informal, verbal, and hence not written down; it is only 
witnessed by a third party, who can be a parent or a friend of the landowner, or the head of the 
village. The agreement is for one horticultural season and is generally based on the share in 
two equal parts of the profit of production. One part is for the sharecropper, who provides the 
labour force and expertise required for the production. The other part is for the landowner, 
who provides to the sharecropper the land plot as well as all the required inputs (seeds, 
organic and mineral fertilizers, pesticides, fuel) and some facilities, such as housing, feeding, 
and occasionally health care. 
For hired wage labour, on the other hand, the landowner pays a fixed wage to the worker. 
Usually, the wage is paid at the end of the cropping season rather than monthly, in agreement 
with the worker. The landowner usually provides the same facilities to the hired wage workers 
as is the case in sharecropping contracts, particularly when they come from far away. 
More and more land tenancy based on fixed rent is less observed in Senegal. On the one hand, 
only very rarely are households willing to rent out their land because they fear to lose their 
land rights, due to the land law providing the right to continued occupancy to the person who 
cultivates the land for a couple of consecutive years. On the other hand, the tenants are 
generally not only landless, but they also are so poor that they lack the financial means that 
would enable them to rent in land and to provide the inputs required for the production. Both 
for the households’ landlord and the landless tenants, who have a limited liability, contracting 
based on sharecropping and wage are the remaining alternatives. A household’s choice 
between these two labour contracts varies in general, depending on the plot size cropped and 
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the level of the irrigation equipment. The reasons behind the labour contract choice need to be 
further investigated. While several theoretical and empirical studies have provided valuable 
information about land tenancy, comparing sharecropping to a fixed rent, very few studies 
have scrutinized the choice between a sharecropping and a wage labour contract, in particular 
in Africa and in a context of modernization of the agricultural production systems. 
Are the contracts with hired labour, either as sharecroppers or as wage labourers, comparable 
to household labour in terms of household profit optimization? At the plot level, controlling 
for irrigation equipment, did the household make the efficient labour contract choice, the 
choice that provides a higher optimum profit? Did the household use inputs efficiently across 
labour contract? This chapter tries to answer these research questions through an in-depth 
investigation of plot-level profit optimization over the labour arrangement made. Therefore, 
after a survey of the literature on land tenancy and the specification of the theoretical and 
empirical models, this chapter will focus on a comparative analysis of household profit 
optimization across plots under household labour, a sharecropping labour contact, or a wage 
labour contract. Then, the chapter will provide evidence on the efficiency of the labour 
contract choice and the inputs used at plot level. From the results, a conclusion will be drawn 
with some policy implications. 
1.2.    A literature review on land tenancy  
In agriculture, a broad assortment of land tenancy forms is practised worldwide. While some 
land lease arrangements are based on sharecropping and a fixed rental, others are in the form 
of wage labour. In fixed rental tenancy, the tenant pays a fixed rent to the landowner, provides 
all inputs and earns the entire output. In share tenancy or sharecropping, the landlord provides 
the land plot and agrees with the tenant the terms of the share of input costs and output, 
depending on the location. These land or labour contracts can be seen as suitable strategies, 
developed to equate land-man ratios over households with different, relative endowments of 
land and labour. 
Many empirical studies have examined the reasons behind the existence and the continuation 
of sharecropping and its social, economic, and policy implications, especially in Asia and, to a 
lesser extent, in Africa (Stiglitz, 1989; Ray 1998; Ghatak and Pandey, 2000; Garrett and Xu, 
2003; Otsuka and Hayami, 1988; Ahmed et al., 2002; Pender et al., 2002; Benin et al., 2005; 
Reiersen, 2001; Araujo and Bonjean, 1999; Canjels, 1996). Despite numerous studies done, 
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land tenancy still remains an attractive subject of research, as shown by several recent 
publications by Ahmed et al. (2002), Benin et al. (2005), Tesfay (2006), Kassie and Holden 
(2007), Holden (2007), and Braido (2008).  
The existing theories of sharecropping were subject to critical reviews in terms of the general 
theory of agency or principal-agent relations. The advantage of sharecropping was associated 
with its savings in transaction costs, but also with risk sharing (Stiglitz, 1989). As supervision 
costs are part of the transaction costs, obviously, a wage labour contract may involve higher 
transaction costs than sharecropping does (Eswaren and Kotwal, 1985). The supervision of the 
work effort of wage labour is more costly than that pertaining to sharecroppers (Ahmed et al., 
2002). Otsuka and Hayami (1988) have emphasised the importance of supervision and other 
forms of transaction costs for the use of hired wage labour. While in a wage labour contract, 
the supervision is undertaken by the landlord and in a fixed rental contract by the tenant, in a 
sharecropping contract, both tenant and landlord have incentives to self-supervise so as to 
mitigate any moral hazard behaviour (Eswaren and Kotwal, 1985). The supervision time spent 
by the household’s landlord to prevent hired workers from cheating is an important part of the 
labour input, particularly in a wage labour contract. The supervision costs evaluated at the 
household’s off-farm wage rate may have an impact on the profitability and the efficiency of 
the labour contract choice to make. This research intends to provide theoretical and empirical 
evidence on this impact. 
Under uncertain circumstances, the existence of sharecropping can be justified by its role in 
risk sharing with and without any enforcement, as long as both landlord and tenant are risk-
averse (Ahmed et al., 2002). While in a fixed rental arrangement, the tenant bears the entire 
risk linked to the production, in a wage labour contract, it is the landlord who bears the whole 
risk, and in a sharecropping contract, it is both the landlord and the tenant who share the risk. 
As demonstrated theoretically (Ray, 1998), a sharecropping contract lowers the return to the 
tenant in a good state and raises it in a bad state, comparatively to a fixed rent. Benin et al. 
(2005) have found that factors increasing the production risk are in favour of sharecropping or 
risk-pooling arrangements, while factors reducing the risk tend to shift land tenancy away 
from sharecropping and in favour of fixed rent leases. All recent models, including that of 
Pender and Fafchamps (2000), incorporate some degree of risk sharing between landlord and 
tenant. Sharecropping is viewed in the literature as a constrained efficient tenancy, which 
balances incentives and risk sharing (Braido, 2008). 
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According to the Marshallian argument,supported by several authors, share tenancy is 
inefficient because the tenant receives only a share of his own marginal product of labour as 
marginal revenue. Contrary to this standard opinion that criticized sharecropping because it is 
inefficient and dampens incentives and productivity, according to Stiglitz (1989), Ray (1998), 
Ghatak and Pandey (2000), and Garrett and Xu (2003), sharecropping is desirable because it 
increases incentives, particularly compared to a wage labour contract. Benin et al. (2005), 
Tesfay (2006), Braido (2008) and others have provided empirical evidence that challenges the 
conventional wisdom connecting sharecropping to disincentives. In particular with regard to 
sharecropping in a Senegalese context, in which the landlord provides all the inputs, the tenant 
actually would have incentives to work hard in order to maximize his profit, especially in case 
he does not have any other alternative off-farm work or can only work at a low wage rate. It 
has been demonstrated that the Marshallian inefficiency implied in many of the share tenancy 
models (Binswanger et al., 1995; Otsuka and Hayami, 1988; Ahmed et al., 2002; Pender et 
al., 2002;  Reiersen, 2001; and Araujo and Bonjean, 1999) was a consequence of a partial or 
incomplete analysis, in which the optimizing behaviour of landlords was neglected, the 
characteristics of tenants and plots were not taken into account, or the range of contract choice 
was very limited (Otsuka and Hayami, 1988). For instance, in Senegal, while the landlords 
have enough land but suffer from a labour shortage, the sharecroppers or tenants are landless 
because they come from other, dry areas, which are inappropriate for any horticultural 
production. 
Altogether, the review of the literature shows that, so far, the coexistence of the different 
forms of land tenancy or labour contract have been explained by different theories relative to 
Marshallian inefficiency, incentives, transaction costs, including the supervision costs of 
labour, moral hazard, risk sharing, screening, and eviction. These theories and the empirical 
evidence have greatly contributed to explain the reasons behind land tenancy or labour 
contract choice. This study follows up on this and also intends to take a further step, by 
focusing particularly on the production technologies at plot level and by making thorough use 
of a theoretical model based on household profit optimization, to compare the optimum profit 
derived from plots based on household labour, a sharecropping labour contract, or a wage 
labour contract. This chapter does not take risk behaviour into account, which we will deal 
with in the next chapter, but focuses mainly on supervision costs. This chapter therefore 
attempts to find out to what extent the supervision rate and the opportunity wages ratios of the 
landlord, the sharecropper, and the wage worker may determine the efficiency of the labour 
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contract based on household profit optimization. In order to test this efficiency of the labour 
contract choice, for each plot, simulations were made to see whether another labour contract 
than presently applied would have yielded a higher profit to household. In doing so, this 
research makes a scientific contribution to the theory of land tenancy, providing theoretical 
and empirical evidence on household profit optimization across labour contract, by using data 
from the Niayes Zone in Senegal. 
1.3. Household modelling and labour 
 Horticultural production is highly labour-demanding. In Senegal, for most households, 
household labour is not sufficient to crop all the land owned. Instead of leaving the land idle 
or renting it out, households try to use the area of land as much as possible. Therefore, many 
households take recourse to hired labour, some based on sharecropping contracts, while others 
prefer to hire labour based on wage contracts. What are the reasons behind these labour 
contract choices? Observations show that households that have large size farms and more 
advanced irrigation equipment are likely to opt for hired wage labour. Households with a 
medium size farm with relatively less irrigation equipment opt for sharecropping. Households 
with small farms and less equipment have a tendency to limit themselves to their own 
household labour. 
Let us consider the problem faced by the household of allocating labour and non-labour inputs 
to a given plot of land. We denote the opportunity cost or wage of household labour by we, of 
sharecroppers by wo, and of hired workers by w. 
Household labour 
Accordingly, in case the household uses only household labour Lh, the profit maximization 
problem can be specified as:  
Max eehxhhyh LwXpXLYp  ),(                                                                                (4.1) 
with respect to Lh and Xh. 
subject to :  
 a time constraint: he LLL                                                                                      (4.2) 
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 a production constraint:  hhh XCLY   
If we specify the production function to be Cobb-Douglas, land-fixed and 1  , we have 
Max )( hehxhhyh LLwXpXCLp                                                                            (4.3) 
First-order conditions (FOC): 
 With respect to Lh, the total household labour used on the plot ,  
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 Knowing Lh* , the optimum household labour, and Xh* , the optimum input, we can derive 
Yh*, the optimum production to supply by household to maximize profit:  
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 The optimum household labour Lh* and input Xh* can be expressed as follows, as a 
function of prices and wage: 
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Hired wage labour under supervision 
If the household opts to hire labour based on a wage contract Lw at wage w, we assume that 
for each unit of wage labour,  units of supervision by the household are needed, at a wage 
rate of household off-farm work we. This is the household’s labour opportunity cost of 
supervising wage labour instead of doing off-farm work. When the household opts for hiring 
labour based on a wage contract, the profit maximization problem is:  
Max wewwxwwyw LwwLXpXLYp   ),(                                                               (4.8) 
subject to production constraint:  www XCLY                                                                 (4.9) 
Max )( ewwxwwyw wwLXpXCLp     
This leads to the following expressions for optimal production and inputs: 
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Compared with the first case of using household labour only, we see that the production and 
use of inputs are lower if w+σwe is greater than we. 
Sharecropping labour 
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Instead of hiring labour based on a wage contract, a household may opt to hire labour based 
on a sharecropping contract. In Senegal, under the usual sharecropping contract, the landlord 
pays for all the inputs. These inputs are deducted from the revenue, to obtain the profit that is 
shared between the landlord and the tenant. The usual share is 50%-50%, but to generalize, 
the share of profit received by the tenant is set to  and that received by the landlord to 1-. 
From a total labour endowment Lt, the tenant or worker can allocate labour Ls to 
sharecropping and Lo to alternative sources of off-farm work at wage wo. So, the tenant’s 
profit maximizing problem is: 
Max oosxssyst LwXpXLYp  ]),([                                                                          (4.11) 
subject to :  
 a production constraint:  sss XLCY .                                                                    (4.12) 
 a time constraint: ost LLL   
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Knowing the optimum sharecropping labour Ls*, the optimum production Ys* can be deduced: 
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The household’s profit maximization problem when opting for a sharecropping labour 
contract is: 
Max ]),()[1( ** sxsssys XpXLYp                                                                           (4.15) 
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with respect to Xs, and with  
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FOC: 
 With respect to Xs, the total inputs used on a sharecropped plot: 
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 Knowing the optimum Xs* , the optimum sharecropping labour Ls* can be expressed as 
follows as a function of prices and wage: 
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 And the optimal production is  
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Knowing the optimum production, the optimum labour and the optimum inputs, the maximum 
profits for the household can be deduced and expressed as follows as a function of prices and 
wage: 
o on plots based on household labour,  
 )1(**   hyh Yp                                                                                       (4.19) 
o on plots based on a wage labour contract: 
)1(**   wyw Yp                                                                                       (4.20) 
o on plots based on a sharecropping contract: 
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The choice between the three land tenancy regimes is based on which profitability is higher: 
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wsh oror  . 
At the given plot size, the household prefers sharecropping over using hired wage workers if  
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Or the profit ratio R 
 
1)()1()1(
1
101
1
1
*
*






 








h
w
s
w
w
R
                                                         (4.23) 
Here, wh may include supervision costs ( eh www  ). For =0 (no supervision), wwh   
and if ho www  , i.e. the sharecropper could also work as a hired worker, this is the case if 
the profit ratio denoted R0: 
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For β=0.5, this will not be the case for values of λ and γ that sum to less than 1. Figure 4.2 
shows the values of the profit ratio R0 for γ=0.1 and varying values of λ. It also shows the 
values of the wage ratio ho ww /  at which the profit ratio R is equal to one (equation 4.23). 
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Figure 4.2: Values of the profit ratio R0 (no supervision and the sharecropping opportunity 
wage equals the wage paid by the household: =0 and ho www  ), and values of the wage 
ratio 
h
o
w
w
 (opportunity cost of sharecropper / wage including supervision cost) at which the 
profit ratio R ( *
*
w
S

 ) is equal to one for γ=0.1 and varying values of λ. 
Hence, sharecropping would be preferred only if the wages are not equal. If the profit ratio R0 
takes on a value of 0.5 (as the graph shows to be perfectly possible), in order to make 
sharecropping the preferred option for the household, we would require a ratio for the wages 
to be  
 2)( 10 



hw
w                                                                                                      (4.25) 
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or the sharecropper’s opportunity wage to be far below that of the hired worker plus 
supervision costs ( ho ww 74.1 ). 
Sharecropping would be preferred, for example, if the supervision costs are 60%, the hired 
wages are the same as the sharecropper’s opportunity costs, and lambda exceeds 0.55. 
High values of λ typically coincide with technologies that are largely based on labour. For in 
these cases, high shares of the revenues would accrue to the factor labour. If λ falls, due to 
other factors of production that demand a share of the revenues, such as land scarcity, other 
inputs or capital (such as motor pumps), the opportunities for sharecroppers fall. Only at very 
low relative wages would sharecropping still be the preferred option for landlords. 
At large plots that would typically show a relatively ample availability of land compared to 
labour, we would expect relatively high values of λ, and more incidence of sharecropping than 
there would be at very small plots. Similarly, with other capital inputs, such as motor pumps, 
we should expect less use of sharecroppers.  
Comparing to household labour, a sharecropping contract would be preferred if: 
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Comparing to household labour, a wage labour contract would be preferred if the hired wage 
paid to hired wage workers, supervision costs included, is lower than the household 
opportunity cost or wage:  
ee www                                                                                                                       (4.28) 
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The household’s efficiency is reflected in its allocation of land to hired wage workers, 
sharecroppers or family workers. As the allocation is done plot by plot, rather than as a 
continuous function of the size of the farm, we can compare the plot regimes and simulate the 
profits that would arise if another regime would be applied. For each farm, we can simulate 
whether another regime than presently applied would yield higher profits to the household. If 
so, the household should be considered inefficient, as an option for higher profits is not used. 
Another comparison of efficiency can be made at the level of the plots themselves. As the 
optimality conditions show, we should expect the marginal product of hired workers to equal 
their wages plus the costs of supervision, both measured per unit of labour (say an hour). The 
marginal product of the sharecropper’s labour should equal his wage rate divided by the share 
accruing to him ( 
ow ).                                                                                                       (4.29) 
1.4.   The empirical analysis 
1.4.1. Functional forms and variables 
The technology is assumed to be similar over labour contract. The production function is 
considered as translog instead of a pure Cobb-Douglas function, in order to capture the 
interaction between a number of variables. Preliminary, all the squared variables and 
interactions terms were used, but most of them were dropped because they were not 
statistically significant at the 10% level and did not improve the model. Finally, the log-linear 
functional form of the production function estimated was specified as follows: 
hichichichic
hichichichichic
SoilSLabMp
MpPlotInputLabY




01_01_log
01_loglogloglog
2
1             (4.32) 
where in household h, on plot i (i=1, 2, ..n) and for crop c {all, onion, cabbage, tomato}, the 
dependent variable logarithm output in value per plot (log Yhic) is a function of logarithm of: 
 Lab, the aggregated working time of household labour or sharecropping labour or 
wage labour, depending on the labour contract, in hours per plot; 
 Plot, plot area cultivated in square meters; 
 Input, the aggregated costs in fcfa per plot of non-labour inputs used, such as mineral 
fertilizers (urea and NPK); 
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 Mp_01, dummy variable for a motor pump  (1=motor pump used for plot irrigation, 
0=otherwise), 
 LabMp, the interaction labour and motor pump (logarithm (labour) *dummy motor 
pump);  
 S_01, dummy variable for horticultural season (1= 1st and 2nd seasons, 0 = 3rd season); 
 Soil_01, dummy variable for soil suitability appreciation by the plot manager (1=good 
or medium, 0=bad); 
 hic ,, error term. 
1.4.2. Endogeneity and the choice of estimator 
In the production function, problems of endogeneity, related to a measurement error or 
simultaneity and reverse causality, may arise particularly with the explanatory variables input 
(fertilizers), labour (household labour, sharecropping labour, or wage labour) and the 
interaction labour-motor pump. This endogeneity may lead to a correlation between these 
explanatory variables with the error terms making the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates 
biased and inconsistent (Verbeek, 2008).  
To test the potential endogeneity of the variables input, labour, and interaction labour-motor 
pump, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test was done. Each of these endogenous right-hand side 
variables was estimated as a function of all exogenous variables to obtain the reduced-form 
equations. The residuals predicted from each reduced-form equation were added to the 
structural form of the production function. The t-test done showed that the residuals were 
significantly different from zero (p=0.05), suggesting a non-zero covariance between the error 
term and the variables input, labour, and interaction labour-motor pump. Consequently, the 
test confirmed the endogeneity of these variables. In such a situation, instrumental variables 
should be used; the Generalized Instrumental Variable (GIVE) known as the Two-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) is one of the best alternative estimators. 
Furthermore, the test of parameters done showed that the variables “use of garden hose for 
irrigation”, “use of sprinkler for irrigation”, “sharecropping dummy”, “share of women’s off-
farm income”, “share of men’s off-farm income”, “log women’s total annual income”, “land 
owned”, “bovine cattle”, “log plot-household distance”, and the interaction terms “share of 
women’s off-farm income and motor pump” and “log women’s total annual income and 
motor pump”,  may be considered as strong instruments, because they are significantly 
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correlated with the endogenous variables (p=0.001 to p=0.07) in the reduced forms. With the 
F-statistic greater than 10, following the Stock-Watson rule-of-thumb (Verbeek, 2008), these 
variables can indeed be considered as strong instruments. We are careful about the problem of 
endogeneity and we did our best to identify these variables as valuables instruments. 
However, we are also cautious about the perfect exogeneity of some of these instrumental 
variables. 
As the data used are cross-sectional, with household as the first sampling unit and plot the 
second one, for the estimation, the option standard errors “clustered robust” is used with 
household as cluster to allow for intra-household correlation, since the observations (plots) are 
independent across households (clusters) but not necessarily within households (repeated plot 
managers). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5.   Empirical results and discussion 
1.5.1. An estimation of the production functions 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the production functions 
estimation. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the plot level, crop-specific production 
functions estimation. 
Variables Overall crops Onion Cabbage Tomato 
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
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Output value (fcfa) 601,693 93,318 772,039 1,112,354 432,843 717,881 288,213 345,348
Labour (hour)  
Input (fcfa)  
Plot area (m2) 
Motor pump_01 
Season_01  
Soil suitability_01 
955 
27,290 
1,720 
0.15 
0.94 
0.98 
1,456 
43,055 
2,204 
0.36 
0.23 
0.10
1,480 
32,247 
1,696 
0.01 
1 
0.98
2,119 
51,018 
1,960 
0.13 
0 
0.11 
619 
21,141 
1,404 
0.22 
0.88 
1.00 
533 
31,396 
2,008 
0.41 
0.31 
0.00 
518 
71,345 
1,081 
0.21 
0.90 
0.96 
283
14,834
1,264
0.41
0.29
0.17
Garden hose_01 
Sprinkler_01 
Sharecropping_01 
Share of women’s off-
farm income (%) 
Share of men’s off-
farm income (%) 
Women’s annual 
income (fcfa) 
Land owned (ha) 
Bovine cattle  
Distance house-plot 
(km) 
0.18 
0.08 
0.29 
32.78 
 
20.77 
 
342,803 
 
4.03 
4.60 
1.37 
0.38 
0.27 
0.45 
38.18 
 
23.74 
 
493,124 
 
3.78 
8.76 
1.19
0.01 
0.006 
0.43 
21.33 
 
23.66 
 
290,446 
 
3.69 
5.88 
1.16
0.11 
0.07 
0.49 
30.84 
 
21.65 
 
315,905 
 
3.88 
10.32 
0.96 
0.16 
0.04 
0.23 
34.41 
 
19.44 
 
415,695 
 
4.18 
3.65 
1.57 
0.37 
0.21 
0.42 
38.26 
 
24.85 
 
579,432 
 
3.46 
7.48 
1.32 
0.24 
0 
0.27 
39.61 
 
18.52 
 
330,759 
 
4.09 
4.56 
1.46 
0.43
0
0.45
40.00
23.51
646,992
3.01
8.99
1.37
Table 4.2 presents the results of the 2SLS and OLS estimations of the production functions for 
overall horticultural crops and for the dominant specific crops, such as onion, cabbage and 
tomato, using data at the plot level. For other horticultural crops, such as potato and green 
bean, the limited number of observations (respectively 9 and 11) did not allow the estimation 
of their crop-specific production functions, particularly when 2SLS is used. The results of the 
estimation differ from those of the previous chapter, because of the difference of the variables 
controlled in the production function and the estimation procedure. In the previous chapter, 
the stochastic frontier production functions were estimated with a maximum likelihood for 
cross-sectional data, in order to derive the efficiency scores. Here, mean production functions 
are estimated rather than frontier production functions.   
Table 4.2: The Two-Stage Least-Squares (2SLS) and Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) 
estimation for plot level crop-specific production functions (robust clusters in households). 
Dependent 
variable: 
Log output in 
value (fcfa) 
Overall crops Onion Cabbage Tomato 
2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 
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Log Labour (hr)  
 
Log Input (fcfa)  
 
Log Plot area (m2) 
 
Motor pump_01 
 
Log labour* 
Pump_01 
Season_01  
 
Soil suitability_01 
 
Constant  
0.39** 
(0.19) 
0.53** 
(0.23) 
0.36** 
(0.17) 
1.51 
(2.33) 
-0.30 
(0.36) 
-0.65*** 
(0.20) 
-0.08 
(0.28) 
3.19*** 
(1.06) 
0.28*** 
(0.05) 
0.14* 
(0.08) 
0.69*** 
(0.07) 
0.82 
(0.85) 
-0.17 
 (0.12) 
-0.47 
(0.14) 
-0.08*** 
(0.19) 
5.25*** 
(0.37) 
0.56 
(0.40) 
0.38* 
(0.23) 
0.33 
(0.30) 
 
 
-0.23 
(0.29) 
 
 
0.59** 
(0.26) 
2.33 
(1.87) 
0.36*** 
(.07) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
0.71*** 
(0.08) 
14.11*** 
(5.14) 
-2.09*** 
(0.81) 
 
 
0.25  
(0.18) 
4.66*** 
0.33 
0.43 
0.35 
0.52** 
0.24 
0.34* 
0.19 
2.08 
2.78 
-0.34 
0.43 
-0.42*** 
0.18 
 
 
2.88 
2.40 
0.20* 
(0.11) 
0.11* 
(0.06) 
0.70*** 
(0.06) 
0.93 
(1.05) 
-0.13 
(0.16) 
-0.40*** 
(0.16) 
 
 
5.73*** 
(0.65) 
0.61* 
0.35 
0.36*** 
0.12 
0.54*** 
0.09 
2.73 
3.87 
-0.54 
0.62 
-0.94*** 
0.35 
-0.46 
0.33 
3.05* 
1.63 
0.33* 
(0.17) 
0.48** 
(0.20) 
0.46*** 
(0.16) 
0.64 
(3.29) 
-0.25 
(0.51) 
-1.02*** 
(0.42) 
-0.31 
(0.37) 
4.04 
(1.07) 
N (plots) 
Cluster (household) 
R2 
Wald Chi2 or F 
336 
140 
0.72 
1302*** 
382 
169 
0.77 
317*** 
141 
72 
0.74 
3937*** 
156 
81 
0.86 
390*** 
134 
94 
0.72 
632*** 
138 
98 
0.79 
138*** 
53 
46 
0.71 
179*** 
63 
56 
0.59 
22*** 
Instrumented Log Input (fcfa), Log labour, Log labour*pump_01 
Additional 
instruments 
Garden hose_01, sprinkler_01, sharecropping_01, land, bovine cattle, share of women’s off-farm 
income, share men’s off-farm income, log plot-household distance, log women’s annual income, share 
of women’s off-farm work*motor pump, log women’s annual income*motor pump 
Test of 
endogeneity: 
Robust F 
 
2.40*  
 
5.23***  
 
1.52  
 
0.63 
Test of 
overidentifying 
restrictions: Chi2 
 
 
2.03 (p=0.84) 
 
 
1.71 (p=0.42) 
 
 
1.89 (p=0.86) 
 
 
2.81 (p=0.72) 
***, **, * significant respectively at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level; robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
The estimates of the 2SLS differ from those of the OLS. Since OLS is supposed to be biased 
and inconsistent because of the endogenous variables input, labour, and labour*pump, the 
analysis focuses on the 2SLS estimates. As the production functions estimated are log-linear 
models, the coefficients of the different inputs used can be interpreted as elasticities. Thus, the 
coefficients are also equivalent to the percentage change in the output in value, resulting from 
a one percent change in the explanatory variables. Regarding overall crops, except the 
variable motor pump and its interaction with labour and variable soil suitability, all other 
variables are significant at least at the 5% level. In terms of elasticity, the coefficients show 
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that a one percent (1%) increase in labour time, whether household labour or sharecropping or 
wage labour, leads to an increase by 0.39% of the output in value per plot if there is no motor 
pump, and only by 0.09% if there is a motor pump. The output in value is significantly 
responsive to input (mineral fertilizers), with an elasticity of 0.53%. A one percent increase in 
plot area cropped also results in an increase of 0.36% of the output in value per plot. The 
seasonal effect is significant and negative, which means that it is increasing from the first and 
second seasons (November-February and March-June, respectively) to the third season (July-
October). This seasonal effect reflects the higher output prices observed in the third season. 
The effect of the use of a motor pump is positive (as long as log labour is lower than 5), while 
the interaction labour-motor pump is negative, showing a decrease of labour working time 
when a motor pump is used. As shown previously in the descriptive chapter, irrigation is the 
most time-costly cropping operation, particularly when it is done manually, with 50% and 
74% of the total time, respectively, on men’s and women’s plots. Thus, it is important to 
understand the effect of a motor pump on the reduction of the working time, even if it is 
statistically not significant at the 10% level. Soil suitability appreciation is negatively related 
to the output in value, but not significant at the 10% level as well. With an R-squared of 0.72, 
the model shows a high goodness of fit for such cross-sectional data. The robust test of 
endogeneity is significant at the 10% level, confirming that the variables input, labour, and 
interaction labour-motor pump are indeed endogenous. The test of overidentifying restrictions 
is not significant (p=0.84), suggesting the validity of all the instruments used and the well-
correct specification of the model.  
As can be read from table 4.2, crop-specific production functions present a great difference. 
The responsiveness of the variables differs from one crop to the other, as shown by the 
difference in terms of magnitude and significance of the coefficients. While the onion output 
is significantly responsive (at the 10% level) to inputs and soil suitability, the cabbage output 
is responsive to input and plot area, and tomato to input, plot area, and labour. As for overall 
crops, the seasonal effect is significant for cabbage and tomato. One percent increase in 
mineral fertilizers input leads to an increase of 0.36%, 0.38% and 0.52% of output in value 
respectively for tomato, onion and cabbage. So, cabbage is more responsive to fertilizers than 
the other crops. The high values of the R-squared (0.71 - 0.74) signal a goodness of fit of the 
crop-specific production functions. Variables such as a motor pump, the season, and soil 
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suitability are dropped on the onion production function because they are quite invariant. The 
same goes for the variable soil suitability in the cabbage production function. 
The technology shows an increasing return to scale, with a total elasticity of land, labour and 
input greater than one on plots without a motor pump. This means that scaling up all inputs by 
one unit may lead to an increase of the output in value by more than one unit for all crops as 
well as for each crop. Thus, plots without a motor pump are smaller than the optimal size. 
Contrary, on plots irrigated with a motor pump, the technology displays a constant return to 
scale, with a total elasticity close to one (table 4.3). 
Table 4.3: The return to scale, controlling for crop and irrigation equipment 
Plots  All crops Onion Cabbage Tomato
Without a motor pump 1.28 1.27 1.29 1.51
With a motor pump 0.98 1.04 0.95 0.97
1.5.2. Household profit optimization across plots under a sharecropping labour 
contract and a wage labour contract  
For each plot under a wage labour contract, we collected the time spent by household labour 
and wage workers. For each plot, the ratio time spent by household labour and time spent by 
hired wage workers was computed. The result shows that, for all crops, for each unit of wage 
labour working time, a household spent on average 0.96 units of time supervising hired 
workers and working, since wage labour is generally hired in order to complement household 
labour. According to households hiring wage labour and the agricultural technicians working 
on the extension services, the supervision itself represents on average a quarter of the time 
spent by household members. For each unit of wage labour working time, a household spent 
on average 0.96 units of time, of which 0.24 was for supervision and 0.72 for a contribution to 
cropping operations. The supervision rate varies greatly from one household to another and 
from one crop to another. As can also be seen from the kernel density (figure 4.2), most of the 
household members spent about 0.20 of their time supervising the wage labour, while very 
few spent more than 0.30 for each unit of wage labour working time.  
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of the supervision rate of wage labour.  
As defined in the household model (equation 4.23), the profit derived by the household from a 
plot under a sharecropping contract is higher than that from a plot under a wage contract if the 
profit ratio 
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                                                             (4.23) 
with wh= w+ we 
where :  
  is the share of profit paid to sharecroppers, equal to 0.5; 
  is the production elasticity of labour: =1 + 2 *motor pump_01. For each plot,  
was calculated.  
  is the production elasticity of other inputs (mineral fertilizers); 
  is the supervision rate of wage labour; 
 wo is the sharecropper’s opportunity cost or wage for farm or off-farm work; 
 we is the household opportunity cost or off-farm wage; 
 w is the wage paid to hired wage labour by the household;  
 wh is the wage paid by the household to wage labour, including the supervision cost  
we. 
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As expected, it can be deduced from the production function estimated (table 4.2) that higher 
values of  are obtained without a motor pump (=0.39 for overall crops, 0.56 for onion, 0.43 
for cabbage, and 0.61 for tomato). When a motor pump is used, the production elasticity of 
labour falls (=0.09 for overall crops, 0.33 for onion, 0.09 for cabbage, and 0.07 for tomato) 
because the irrigation equipment takes a share of the revenue or output in value. 
Consequently, it is hypothesized that when a motor pump is used, producers would not prefer 
to hire labour based on sharecropping so much because it is less profitable.  
Given  and the estimates  and  of the production function (table 4.2), simulations were 
made at plot level to calculate the optimum profit ratio s*/w* above (equation 4.23): 
 first, by setting the opportunity cost of sharecropping equal to the wage paid to wage 
workers by the household, including supervision costs: wo=wh or wo/wh =1;   
 second, by setting the opportunity cost of sharecropping lower than the wage paid to 
wage workers by the household, including supervision costs (wo< wh), but equalizing 
hired wages for household plot managers, sharecroppers, and wage labourers 
(we=wo=w) and varying the supervision costs of wage labour (). This means varying 
wo/wh (figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3: A comparison of the average optimum profit derived by the household from plots 
under a sharecropping contract and a wage labour contract and controlling for a motor pump. 
Figure 4.3 is based on the estimates of the production function and shows the variation of the 
average profit ratio s*/w* (equation 4.23), varying the wage ratio wo/wh and the supervision 
rate . As can be read from figure 4.4, the results of the simulations of the profit ratio s*/w* 
show that if the opportunity cost or wage of sharecroppers equals the wage paid by the 
household to hired wage labour plus their supervision cost (wo=wh or wo/wh =1), for overall 
crops, the optimum profit derived by the household from a sharecropping contract is lower 
than that from a wage labour contract (profit ratio s*/w*<1). This is the case whether a motor 
pump is used for irrigation on the plot or not. Consequently, at equal wages, for overall 
horticultural crops, the household would prefer to hire labour based on a wage contract rather 
than a sharecropping contract to maximize profit. This conclusion also holds for onion, 
cabbage and tomato. 
The production elasticity of labour () falls when a motor pump is used for irrigation, and as 
can be observed from graph 4.4, the profit ratio s*/w* (equation 4.23) is much lower, making 
sharecropping less profitable compared to the same case without a motor pump. When the 
ratio opportunity cost or the wage of the sharecroppers and the wage paid by the household to 
hired wage labour, supervisions cost (wo/wh) included, decreases, or the other way round, 
when the wage paid by the household to hired wage labour becomes much higher (due to a 
higher supervision rate) than the opportunity cost of the sharecroppers (wh>wo), the profit 
ratio s*/w* increases. When wo/wh is equal to 0.9, corresponding to a supervision rate () of 
about 10%, the profit ratio s*/w* becomes greater than one and, consequently, the profit 
derived by the household from plots under a sharecropping contract is higher than that from a 
wage labour contract (s*>w*). This applies to plots without a motor pump, whereas for plots 
irrigated with a motor pump, a wage labour contract would be more profitable. 
Considering the average rate of the supervision of wage labour applied by a household, which 
is 24%, the ratio opportunity cost or the wage of sharecroppers and the wage paid by the 
household to hired wage labour (wo/wh) is equal to 0.81, while the profit ratio s*/w* is equal 
to 2.10 for plots without a motor pump and 0.56 for plots irrigated with a motor pump. 
Consequently, on average, the profit ratio s*/w* is greater than one on plots without a motor 
pump, contrary to plots with a motor pump. This result suggests that, on average, on plots 
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without motor pumps, a sharecropping contract provides to the household a higher optimum 
profit than a wage contract does. However, on average, on plots irrigated with a motor pump, 
a wage labour contract leads to more optimum profit than a sharecropping contract does. On 
these plots with a motor pump, the simulations show that even when the wage paid by the 
household is two times greater than the wage of a sharecropper (wo/wh=1/2), corresponding to 
a supervision rate of 100%, the household would still prefer to hire labour based on a wage 
labour contract rather than on sharecropping. Definitively, on plots equipped with a motor 
pump, hiring labour based on a wage contract is always more profitable for the household 
than that based on a sharecropping contract. 
For crops like onion, cabbage and tomato, and without a motor pump, a sharecropping 
contract leads to a higher optimum profit for the household (profit ratio s*/w*>1) compared 
to wage contract, at the average rate of supervision applied by the household (=24%), 
corresponding to a wage ratio of wo/wh, equal to 0.81. When plots are irrigated with a motor 
pump, at this average rate of supervision, hiring labour based on a wage contract is more 
profitable for the household (profit ratio s*/w* <1). 
 
Graph 4.4 provides a better illustration of the optimization of the household’s profit under a 
labour contract, controlling for crop and motor pump. As can be seen from the graph, the 
profit optimization from plots equipped with a motor pump differs from that without a motor 
pump. While cabbage and onion present the same profit optimization, there is a great 
difference regarding tomato. To sum up, without a motor pump, for all crops together as well 
as for each crop, sharecropping becomes the most profitable labour choice when the wage 
ratio wo/wh decreases corresponding to an increase of the supervision costs of wage labour. 
However, when plots are equipped with a motor pump, sharecropping is not the optimum 
choice, either at 0% or at 100% of the supervision cost for overall crops and for most of the 
crops. 
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Figure 4.4: A comparison of the average optimum profit derived by the household from plots 
under a sharecropping contract and a wage labour contract, and controlling for crop and motor 
pump. 
 
 
 
 
1.5.3. An efficiency test of the labour contract choice based on optimum profit: the 
sharecropping labour contract versus the wage labour contract 
The test was done for overall crops as well as for cabbage and tomato. Due to limited 
observations under a wage labour contract, the test was not done for onion. Figure 4.5 
presents the results of the simulations of the ratios by labour contract. 
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Figure 4.5: An efficiency test of labour contract choice based on optimum profit and varying 
supervision rate or wage ratio: sharecropping labour contract versus wage labour contract. 
For overall crops, on plots based on household labour, sharecropping labour and wage labour, 
when wo/wh is equal to 0.9, corresponding to a supervision rate () of about 10%, the profit 
ratio s*/w* becomes greater than one, implying that the optimum profit derived from a 
sharecropping contract is higher than that derived from wage contract. Consequently, from 
10% of the supervision rate, the labour choice is efficient on plots based on sharecropping 
labour and is not efficient on plots based on a wage contract.  
 
Considering the average rate of supervision of wage labour (=24%) applied by the 
household and corresponding to a wage ratio wo/wh equal to 0.81, the profit ratio s*/w* is 
greater than one on plots without a motor pump, whether under sharecropping, a wage 
contract or household labour, and for overall crops as well as for each crop. These findings 
mean that, on average, the labour choice is efficient on plots without a motor pump and under 
sharecropping labour, because this choice provides the highest optimum profit to the 
household. Contrary, on average, the labour choice is not efficient on plots without a motor 
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pump and under wage labour. Inversely, when a motor pump is used for irrigation, the profit 
ratio s*/w* is always lower than one suggesting that a higher optimum profit would be 
derived from a wage labour contract. Accordingly, wage labour would be the efficient labour 
choice for plots equipped with a motor pump. 
The analysis of the data shows that the labour choice is efficient on 82% of the plots under 
sharecropping labour and on 34% of the plots under a wage labour contract. Many plots 
without a motor pump under a wage labour contract would be under a sharecropping contract 
for household profit optimization. Altogether, plot managers made the right labour choice on 
73% of the plots under a sharecropping or a wage labour contract (table 4.4). 
Table 4.4: Plots with an efficient labour contract choice 
Labour 
Plots 
Plots with an efficient 
labour contract choice
Total
Without a 
motor pump 
With a motor 
pump 
Frequency 
(plots) 
Percent 
Sharecropping labour contract 124 102 22 102 82
Wage labour contract 29 19 10 10 34
Total 153 121 32 112 73
1.6.    Conclusion and policy implications 
In Senegal, labour contracts are used by horticultural households’ landowners as suitable 
strategies to overcome their labour deficit. They are also convenient arrangements for the 
tenants, who are landless because they come from areas that are inappropriate for horticulture. 
This chapter provides theoretical and empirical evidence by designing and testing a model 
based on household profit optimization, to compare the optimum profit derived from plots 
based on household labour, a sharecropping labour contract and a wage labour contract, while 
controlling for irrigation equipment. In doing so, this research makes a scientific contribution 
to the theory of land tenancy, using data from Senegal’s Niayes Zone.  
Considering the average rate of supervision of wage labour applied by the household which is 
estimated at 24%, the results suggest that, on average, on plots without motor pumps, a 
sharecropping contract provides to the household a higher optimum profit than a wage 
contract does. However, on plots irrigated with a motor pump, even if the wage paid by the 
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household is two times higher than the wage of a sharecropper (wo/wh =1/2), corresponding to 
a supervision rate of 100%, the household would still prefer to hire labour based on a wage 
labour contract rather than on sharecropping. Consequently, we can conclude from this 
finding that the use of a motor pump drives out the sharecropping contract in favour of the 
wage labour contract. 
In terms of the efficiency implication, the test of the labour contract choice based on optimum 
profit suggests that, at the average rate of the supervision of wage labour applied by the 
household (24%), without a motor pump, the labour choice is efficient on plots under 
sharecropping labour, because this choice provides the highest optimum profit to the 
household. However, on plots equipped with a motor pump, wage labour would be the 
efficient labour choice. Altogether, plot managers made the efficient labour choice on 73% of 
the plots under a sharecropping or a wage labour contract. 
To sum up, these findings provide a better understanding of the reasons behind the existence 
and perpetuation of sharecropping over time and over developing countries like Senegal. The 
findings sketch the trend or the dynamic of the labour contract in a context of mechanization 
of the production. With the use of the motor pump, the future of the sharecropping 
arrangement is threatened in favour of the wage labour contract, unless the sharing terms for 
the landowner change. These findings call for some policy implications. Most of all, an 
improvement of irrigation equipment is urgently required, not only to make the production 
system less labour-intensive and to reduce the horticultural households’ labour dependence on 
sharecropping and wage labour, but also to enable large-scale production and to improve the 
economic performance. Actually, the plots, and particularly those under household labour, are 
mostly very small. They often are under the optimum size, mainly because of labour and 
water constraints rather than land availability. Good agricultural programmes should be able 
to address these constraints and to lead to key achievements if designed and implemented 
successfully. 
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